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Policing the Port, Watching the City.
Manifestations of Organised Crime in the Port of Genoa 
Abstract 
This article will present the results of a qualitative research into organised crime in the port 
of Genoa, Italy’s largest port, by looking at the challenges of policing the port space. 
Through the case of Genoa, the paper reflects on how organised crime manifests across three 
trajectories in seaports: trafficking through the port, infiltration in the port economy and governance 
of the port management. This paper argues that the space and geography of the port-city relationship 
are key to understand how and to what extent different organised criminal groups act in and around 
the port and within global drives. An integrated approach between urban criminology and organised 
crime studies is needed to better map the very complex picture of organised criminality in the port 
within the city.
Introduction 
     
Where the sea meets the land, in a series of coves and inlets in the deep blue Tirrenian sea in 
the North of Italy, the city of Genoa spreads across almost a hundred kilometres of coast, 30 of which 
occupied by the port. Genoa, also known as La Superba (the Superbe), between 1000 and 1700 built 
its reputation on the volumes of trades and on commerce through the port as a maritime republic 
“superiorem non recognoscens” (Republic that recognises no superior, the city’s motto). The identity 
of the city is a maritime identity, with the museum of the sea, the history of the Camalli - the peculiar 
name given to port workers - the lighthouse, the Lantern, as symbol of the city.
Genoa’s port is often referred to as a city within the city and it represents one of the main 
sources of wealth for the region. According to a governmental study run in 2017 the port adds a 12.6% 
of workforce to the economy of the city and represents the 8.3% of the total workforce of the region 
(Invitalia et al., 2017: 73). Additionally, while 61% of port activities are directly contributing to the 
port economy (trade and commerce included), the remaining 39% contributes to other sectors, among 
which construction, transports, the food & hospitality industries and other services to individuals and 
companies operating in or through the port. Moreover, 48% of the port economy contributes to the 
Liguria region, while the rest is spread out to reach neighbours such as Lombardia, Piedmont, 
Toscana, Veneto and even the far away Lazio region (Invitalia et al., 2017: 73). 
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Genoa’s port is also well known for being a hub for illicit trafficking and smuggling activities on 
the waterfront, also thanks to the proximity to France, Switzerland and North European markets 
(DNA, 2017). The city of Genoa, its port and the region of Liguria more generally, have been object 
of close scrutiny by Italian authorities in the past years. The Italian Antimafia Commission – a 
parliamentary commission that analyses the phenomena of organised crime and mafias in Italy – 
conducted a special mission to Genoa in July 20171 and found that Liguria is one of the most worrying 
regions in the North of Italy when it comes to the presence of organised crime. In particular there is, 
in Liguria, a presence of mafia-type criminal groups, especially the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta (Sergi and 
Lavorgna, 2016), which not only profit from illicit activities such as drug trafficking, but also 
influence the legal economy, the management of infrastructures and large contracts and also the world 
of politics. Drug trafficking is particularly effective in Liguria thanks to the ports, not only Genoa but 
also the smaller ones of Imperia and Vado Ligure, where both mafia organisations and other criminal 
groups have different connections and prolific businesses. As also confirmed by Padovano (2016) 
recent investigations in the city of Genoa lead to believe that among unionised port workers and port 
employees there have been some “rotten apples” who have been found facilitating drug importations. 
This has come almost as a shock to the city, where the port workers are known, historically, for their 
civil and social engagement in the city. 
Exploring the manifestations of organised crime in the port of Genoa has been the main aim of 
this research. The main argument of this paper is that an analysis of organised crime in the port of 
Genoa needs to consider the marked urban identity of the port. Understanding the space of the port, 
and how it sits within the city, is paramount to define priorities and challenges of policing organised 
crime on the waterfront of Genoa. Through the case study of the port of Genoa, this paper proposes 
a tri-partite analysis of organised crime in seaports: illicit trafficking, infiltration in the port economy, 
and criminal governance of the port territory. Finally, this paper argues that organised crime in the 
port can also be seen as a fragment – a synecdoche - of organised crime in the city, and this has clear 
relevance for policy and practice. 
Crime on the waterfront
     
Ports are analytical loci through which several dilemmas of contemporary global economies 
emerge (e.g. deregulation of international trades, everyday life globalisation and illegality in markets) 
(Nordstrom, 2007). Port economy and maritime commercial networks have been widely discussed in 
1 Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno delle Mafie e sulle altre associazioni criminali, anche 
straniere Relazione Conclusiva Relatrice: On. Rosy Bindi, 8 February 2018
http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/documentiparlamentari/IndiceETesti/023/038/INTERO.pdf 
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economics and globalisation studies (Daamen & Vries, 2013). Different studies (see for example the 
edited volume by Carpenter and Lozano, 2020) have looked at the economy of port cities as 
“narratives of cosmopolitanism and even exceptionalism” (Mah, 2014: 1). Indeed, while embedded 
in global dynamics, port cities share “global legacies” (Mah, 2014: 1). Developments and 
transformations of global trade networks have affected histories of migrant communities and/or 
political actions of working-class on the waterfront. Indeed, port cities are a specific kind of urban 
context where it’s possible to observe local and global changes at the same time. As Wang et al. 
(2007: xv) argue, “seaports that were significant for a ‘slower’ but no less global economy have been 
undergoing transformation, re-imagining and re-inventing themselves, to stay economically and 
culturally “relevant”. Links with classical criminological issues clearly emerge: for example, the 
extent to which informal and criminal activities are intertwined with relations of trades, and also the 
mechanisms through which illegal economy runs on the same track as that of international economic 
exchanges.
Criminological enquiries on the peculiarities of the port environment are quite limited, 
notwithstanding the wealth of research and attention to crimes that touch the port – primarily 
trafficking of illegal goods, i.e. drugs or weapons (Eski, 2011; Farrell, 1998). Ports are virtually 
always mentioned in relation to organised crime, first as they are key entry or exit points for drugs, 
other illegal goods and/or smuggled people, second as they are extremely difficult places to police 
and secure (Eski, 2019; Demeri, 2012). Indeed, crime control at the waterfront is a “formidable task” 
(Brewer, 2014: 9) because ports are places in constant flow, with different infrastructures belonging 
to different owners and having different interests (Christopher, 2015).
Empirical criminological research has approached different ports more or less always as case-
studies, either individually or comparatively. Studies on port security and governance dominate the 
literature. Analysis of security providers and their challenges and efforts has shown how not only 
multi-agency approaches remain the only possible solution to the complexity of governing ports 
(Brewer, 2014), but also that the shortcomings of policing and surveillance remain the main problems 
in making the port a crime-free environment (Madsen, 2018; Eski and Kankaras, 2015). It has been 
demonstrated that the need to deliver security at the port – which was prompted by a number of 
specific international tools, such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 
created in 2002 after 9/11 by the International Maritime Organisation (Eski and Carpenter, 2013) – 
creates rivalry across different actors and agencies involved, as well as difficulties in information 
sharing across institutions in the same port. 
A discourse on complex crime and port policing and security must also consider the effects 
of privatisation on the port environment, both in relation to the privatisation of port management and 
in relation to the privatisation of security (Eski, 2019). The former clearly affects employment 
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relations in the port (for example between port workers and companies who manage the terminals) 
(Madsen, 2018; Christopher, 2015) as well as the port economy and the city behind the port (Talley, 
2009). The latter places considerable pressure on operational coordination across police actors, law 
enforcement and security providers (Eski and Carpenter, 2013). 
Finally, some literature has looked at criminality in the ports from the perspective of actors 
and networks of offenders (Zaitch, 2002; Antonopolous, 2008). Criminality on the waterfront ranges 
from the occasional involvement of port workers in illicit activities to the systemic corruption of 
union members and/or border and custom agents (Eski and Bujit, 2016); from the laundering of 
proceeds of crime in the maritime supply chain to complex trafficking of drugs, weapons or humans 
(Chalk, 2008; Eski, 2016); from piracy in high waters (Liss, 2011) to corruption of high ranking coast 
guard officers for smuggling operations (Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010) to terrorist activities 
(Greenberg et al., 2006). As Eski and Bujit (2016) pointed out, there is seldom just a financial 
motivation behind criminality in the port: socio-economic explanations as well as criminal seduction 
make the waterfront particularly interesting to study, as a stand-alone space, as a portion of the urban 
space and as a particular area where organised crimes occur.  
Organised crime is one of those terms that carry an “emotional kick” (Levi, 1998: 336) also 
in academia - having almost 200 definitions for the term (Von Lampe, 2016). The term refers to both 
serious criminality that includes harmful crimes committed in patterns - such as trafficking of drugs 
- as well as mafia-type activities, such as infiltration of ‘dirty’ funds in the legal economy and/or 
systemic corruption of public administration and/or politics (Sergi, 2017). Especially in the urban 
environment, phenomena of organised crime evoke images of gangsterism and street violence, but 
also control of economic and/or social enterprises, often connected to the night-time economy, within 
the entertainment business and its security services (Kupka et al., 2018), to the construction industry 
and the management of public funds and services (such as waste management or green economy) 
(Greyl et al., 2013; Caneppele et al., 2013; Calderoni and Caneppele, 2009; Dagnes et al., 2019). In 
the urban setting, different social factors, such as national and cross-border migration, economic 
transformations and investments, as well as political actions, all shape phenomena of organised crime 
and their control strategies (Jacobs et al., 1999; Hobbs, 2013). Mindful of this complex picture, in 
this paper organised crime refers to a spectrum of activities ranging from profit-driven criminal 
groups, i.e. drug trafficking networks, to profit and power-driven ones, i.e. mafia-type groups. 
Reference will be made to the main activities of these groups, from illicit trafficking to infiltration in 
the legal economy and to meddling into development and political administration of the port, in a 
profit-power spectrum (Sergi, 2017) that includes both activities of illicit and licit trade and of 
governance of space and markets (Varese, 2011; Campana and Varese, 2018). 
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Context and Methods
     
The port of Genoa is Italian biggest port. It ranks 68th in the world’s largest container ports 
and 8th in Europe2. With a total of 16 terminals and 2.6 million TEUs3 of container traffic per year 
(about 26 million tons), the amounts of goods and passengers going through Genoa is impressive. As 
a landlord port, Genoa’s port public land is leased out (law 84/1994) to private companies who run 
the port facility’s economic activities as well as implement security regulations by nominating a Port 
Facility Security Office (PFSO) as required by the ISPS code. Around 60,000 people work at the Port 
of Genoa, says its website.
This paper presents the results of a qualitative research conducted between December 2018 
and February 2019. First, background data collection has selected relevant institutions involved in 
port security and policing. Then these institutions have been contacted for interviews or team focus 
groups. A total of 12 meetings have been carried out: Capitaneria di Porto (port authority security 
office, 2 people), Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia (DDA, district antimafia prosecutor office, 1 
person), Procura della Repubblica (public prosecutor office, 1 person), Guardia di Finanza (fiscal 
police, 2 meetings with 4 people each), Polizia di Frontiera (border police, 1 person), Agenzia delle 
Dogane (customs agency, 2 people), Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA, investigative antimafia 
directorate, 1 person) in the Genoa province, and Port Facility Security Officers (PFSOs, 3 people). 
The roles of these authorities are summarised in table 1:
[Insert Table 1]
Interviews and focus groups followed a thematic guide revolving around the following topics:
1. The role of the institution in fighting organised crime within and around the port;
2. The types of criminal activities in and around the port that the institution links to organised 
crime;
3. The differences, if identifiable, across criminal groups active in the port according to their 
aims and short/medium/long term goals. 
Additionally, the author has been granted access and toured three container terminals, SECH 
(South European Container Hub), Spinelli and VTE (Voltri Terminal Europe, whose name has 
2 One Hundred Ports 2018  - Lloyd’s List Maritime Intelligence Informa - 
https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/one-hundred-container-ports-2018 
3 Twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU or teu) is an inexact unit of cargo capacity often used to describe the 
capacity of container ships and container terminals. It is based on the volume of a standard-sized 20-foot-long 
(6.1 m) intermodal container.
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changed to PSA Genova Prà since 2018 even if it is still commonly known as Voltri). A walking 
methodology has supported the collection of data during these visits, as the author has chosen to walk 
to the terminals as much as feasible and grasp the sense of space of the port. This helped adding 
cultural meaning to complex spaces (Natali and McClanahan, 2017; Natali, 2016; Kane, 2004; Degen 
and Rose, 2012). Taking pictures and recording self-reflective audio-notes has provided the necessary 
sensorial background, which was very useful when rethinking the context in which other data was 
collected and helpful when contextualising the relationship between the port and the city 
(McClanahan and South, 2020). 
The three terminals visited were selected as they are the biggest and busiest ones. Table 2 
shows traffic in the three terminals during February 2019. Although organised crime manifests also 
in relation to passengers’ terminals (human trafficking or smuggling for example), in this research 
the focus has been mostly maintained on container terminals. 
[Insert Table 2]
It is beyond the scope of this paper to comment on the nature of commerce and trade to and 
from Genoa. It is estimated by interviewees in the Custom Agency that not even 5% of all the 
containers moving across the port are scrutinised (and scrutiny does follow previous risk 
assessments). Both inbound and outbound traffic feature some of the areas of the world commonly 
associated to the cocaine trade both for arrivals (from Colombia, Mexico, Spain) and for destination 
(USA or Morocco) (UNODC, 2018). Table 3 gives some basic information about destinations and 
volumes of traffics.
     
[Insert table 3]
Last but not least, as judicial cases were often mentioned in the interviews and/or the 
documents collected, this research has been enriched through a selection of case law, retrieved 
through online portals of Italian courts using keywords (in Italian of course) such as “port of Genoa 
+ organised crime”, “port of Genoa + mafia”, “port of Genoa + trafficking”, “port of Genoa + 
infiltration”; “port of Genoa + corruption”. The results were filtered to the last 15 years alone and 
include only cases that have reached the last court of appeal: they amount to 23 relevant cases.
The study has obviously a number of limitations, due to the difficulty to access certain hard-
to-reach security authorities and to cross-check relevant data from documents as well. Every effort 
has been made to assemble a wide range of sources to secure a representative and diversified amount 
of data was collected.
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Data Analysis 
Obviously, the majority of data comes from institutional perspectives, which means that data 
provides often a one-way perspective. This is an ontological bias of the data and needs to be taken 
into account. The author took two actions to mitigate this bias: first, by using a two-tier coding coding, 
to first assemble themes and then cross-cut through themes in different data sources; second, by 
associating the first-hand walking and observation methodology described above, to critically situate 
the data within those spaces the data was narrating. These steps allowed for a critical approach to the 
data, for as much as possible. The first-tier coding has been a thematic and content analysis to assess 
how organised crime, as conceptualised in this type of data, was fitting within the project’s own 
operationalisation of the term. As said, organised crime was operationalised on a spectrum ranging 
from profit-driven to power and profit driven serious criminality. This coding confirmed that in the 
port, different behaviours are different types of criminal groups, from mafia groups to looser networks 
to corruption cartels. It needs to be reminded that, in Italy, narratives on serious organised crime often 
overlap with those of mafia groups (Sergi, 2015; Sergi, 2017); this is a prejudice that the analysis 
considers. In Genoa we find loose networks (occasional and mono-crime, profit driven), non-mafia 
groups (which are groups of different ethnicities, still profit driven) and mafia groups (systemic and 
polycrime, profit and power driven). Graphic 1 summarises the findings from first coding both from 
interviews and case law. 
     
[Insert graphic 1]
Activities and actors in the port move across two different spectra when it comes to 
categorisations of organised crime. On one side we find systemic players (such as mafia groups) 
involved in fully illegal activities (i.e. drug trafficking); on the other side we have the same actors 
(mafia groups) involved in activities in the legal sphere (i.e. bid rigging). Similarly, involvement of 
port workers in illegal activities (i.e. drug distribution) could be both occasional and systemic while 
other complex activities, such as illegal waste disposal, could be done both by individuals and/or 
companies. Looser networks are involved in one-off attempts to traffic waste as much as non-mafia 
groups are routinely involved in drug trafficking and/or distribution.
The second-tier coding merged the themes from the first-tier coding related to organised crime 
in the port, trying to cross-cut different narratives and different data sources. Activities and aims of 
organised crime groups in the port can be seen as moving across three trajectories within the policing 
and security context of the port: trafficking through the port, infiltration in the port economy and 
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governance of the port territory. This tri-partite analytical scheme has been used also to approach 
further fieldwork on organised crime in other ports, comparatively, beyond this paper. Additionally, 
the perception of the space of the port within the city, emerged as an unexpectedly relevant item in 
this research. When authorities were illustrating difficulties of policing the port and were discussing 
criminal opportunities in the port, they stressed repeatedly how important are the geography and the 
space of the port as a segment of the urban environment. 
This last finding was also enriched by the walking methodology. The walk from the Old Port 
to reach two of the three terminal containers visited, Spinelli and SECH, is 45-50 minutes long, and 
it crosses the city following the sea line in a generous U shape. The walk touches upon the Darsena 
terminal, Stazione Marittima (the passengers’ terminal), Dinegro (the ferry terminal) and 
progressively leaves the splendour of the urban design of the Old Port to the much more post-
industrial landscape of the terminal containers. Above Spinelli and SECH terminals, which lie next 
to one another, the Lighthouse (La Lanterna), watches over the bay and already shows what will 
become clearer in the interviews: the physical proximity of the terminals to the city is obviously one 
of the peculiarities of this port. 
Being the largest and newest container terminal, for both volume of traffic and types of ships 
it can host, Terminal VTE (Now Genoa-Pra’) is reachable by car or with a train followed by 20 
minutes’ walk (which is what the author did during the two visits there). The arrival to the terminal 
confirms that VTE is a very different reality from the city terminals. Gates protect the entry, clear 
road signs indicate where vehicles must go. People can walk through, but should not really be there 
on foot, in between cars and enormous trucks carrying in or out containers. The two visits in Voltri 
were made during a normal day of business and during a day in which the terminal was closed due to 
snow. In both instances, a constant feeling of being in a bunker, where entry or exit are under constant 
surveillance. VTE feels, and is portrayed by the authorities, as a separate and critical entity - distant 
enough from the city to be the largest terminal, but also remaining the most connected to the city’s 
economy and the most active nevertheless. 
 After the second-tier analysis, organised criminality in the port not only appears linked to the 
urban criminal landscape, but is also shaped by the perceptions of the geography and the space of the 
port. These perceptions also impact policing coordination on and around the waterfront and, this paper 
argues, are also likely to affect the way organised crime develops in the city-port relationship. If we 
imagine criminality in the city as a jigsaw, the port is one of the most revealing pieces of the puzzle. 
The following sections will present the three trajectories of organised crime in the port of Genoa. 
Each section will also reflect on how the perception of the space of the port within the urban 
geography plays a role in the way we contextualise these trajectories and their policing responses.
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Illicit Trafficking
     
 When it comes to trafficking, the port represents a gate for entry or exit and the city is transit 
or destination for trafficked goods. Both case law and interviews/focus groups confirmed that – when 
it comes to trafficking - the authorities’ focus remains primarily on drugs, especially cocaine. Cocaine 
trade in the port involves a number of actors, some of which are visible, some others are elsewhere. 
The Guardia di Finanza confirms a recent report by the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA, 2017) 
and indicated that Calabrian mafia-type clans (‘ndrangheta) are considered the reference players for 
trafficking cocaine arriving from Colombia or Morocco, but they often do so from neighbouring 
countries, such as Spain or France or Germany, while maintaining their contacts in the Calabria 
region. 
Case law and interviews/focus groups at both the Antimafia District Directorate (DDA) and 
the Guardia di Finanza, confirm that while cocaine trafficking through the port is often organised by 
Calabrian clans, the market of distribution (especially wholesale, high, distribution) appears flexible, 
accessible to newcomers and associates of the ‘ndrangheta clans, of different ethnicities (DNA, 2018), 
who have access to the port in different roles. Port workers and terminal employees are involved on 
a more or less occasional basis (Padovano, 2015; 2016), but not that often, as they are disposable to 
criminal organisations and they are more likely to be caught. Drug cases considered in this project 
show some common characteristics: the multi-ethnic background of the network active in the port; 
the access to the port granted by via a worker/employee; the existence of many external units to the 
network that provide information or organise the shipment. For example, in Operation Rebuffo4 in 
2017 (in 2019 awaiting appeal), 5 men were charged – a port worker (with the CULMV5) and an 
employee of Spinelli, both from Genoa, two Albanian nationals and a Calabrian man with links to 
‘ndrangheta clans in Genoa and Milan. The importation of 75 kg of cocaine hidden in bags - and/or 
ready to be bagged - in the front of a container on the ship “Carolina Star” from South America (rip-
off system6), was mainly destined to the local market and to France. 
Even if drugs make up for the majority of cases about trafficking, the authorities, especially 
Customs, noticed the evergreen presence of other forms of inbound trafficking, mainly on excise 
4 Procura della Repubblica, press il Tribunale di Genova, DDA, Proc Pen. N. 13335/2017 RGNR/Mod. 21
5 CULMV – Compagnia Unica fra i Lavoratori delle Merci Varie (Sole Company for Workers of Various 
Goods) – is the principal and the oldest company streamlining port workers’ services in the port of Genoa, 
counting around 1000 members. 
6 The “rip-off system” is a concealment methodology whereby a legitimate shipment via a container is 
exploited to smuggle contraband (particularly cocaine) from the country of origin or the transhipment port to 
the country of destination. In "rip-off" cases, neither the shipper nor the consignee is aware that their shipment 
is being used to smuggle illicit cargo (UNODC website definition)
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goods. Cases include illegal tobacco and counterfeit goods, such as food, as showed in Operation 
Provvidenza7 where inferior quality extra-virgin olive oil going from Calabria, through Genoa, to the 
United States. 
Outbound trafficking mostly involves waste trafficking (i.e. shipping waste without paying 
the correct duties on the shipment): this seems to be linked to the high number of routes to North and 
West Africa where these products seems to be mostly destined. Actors involved in this type of illicit 
activities are usually companies that are trying to profit from the lack of controls on duty evasion. 
The involvement of white-collar and corporate criminality is, unsurprisingly, the most controversial 
for authorities, as it might touch ‘high powers’ in the city.
Counter-trafficking efforts are heavily centred around, and influenced by, the space 
configuration of the port. Security plans in port facilities are visibly delivered via environmental 
design, on the basis of situational crime prevention techniques (Von Lampe, 2011; Bullock et al., 
2012): the aims are to monitor, control and ban access through the use of surveillance camera, smart 
cards, ban on foot-walk, barriers, and so on. This indicate that, for purposes of counter trafficking 
efforts, policing and security functions in the port converge in crime prevention frameworks (Prenzler 
and Sarre, 2012). Increased security controls in Genoa are the result of several reforms happening in 
the field of maritime security worldwide as much as at the national level (Eski, 2016; Brewer, 2014). 
These controls seem to have favoured the displacement of certain criminal activities (Elkwall, 2009). 
For example, authorities have noticed, especially at VTE, a slow but steady abandonment of the rip-
off system as it would be very difficult to open containers and walk around the terminal unnoticed. 
Other smuggling techniques, such as the movement of a whole container outside of the terminal, seem 
to be preferred.
As said, reducing opportunities for crime, imposing obstacles and creating a hostile 
environment for deviance are the aims of situational crime prevention that are pursued by port 
terminals in Genoa. Monitoring and controlling access and mobility in and around of the port is the 
common struggle of all authorities especially because the port environment is made of habits and 
patterns: people tend to know each other; they tend to move around in the same patterns as well. As 
shared by the PFSO of VTE: “Habit, in my line of work, familiarity, is the worst enemy of security. 
The agent that lets you in because he/she knows you is the worst thing”. A very similar message is in 
SECH, on the wall upon entrance to the terminal (reading, “Habit Our Enemy”), a sign that the 
terminal is embracing the same philosophy.  
Arguably, the configuration of space affects counter-trafficking efforts also because of the 
geography of terminals in relation to the city. Spinelli and SECH terminals are located in the city 
7 Procura della Repubblica, Tribunale Ordinario di Reggio Calabria, Proc. Pen. n. 206/2017 R.G.N.R. Mod. 
21 DDA
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centre, and therefore, most of what happens in and around them is so absorbed in the city routine that 
it often goes unnoticed. At Spinelli, the Guardia di Finanza observed how “once a container, or a 
bag or a person is out of the port, it takes a couple of minutes to be out in the city or on the main 
road; this is not just about more or less security, it’s about the territory”. The Guardia di Finanza 
reminds also that there are differences – due to space and geography again – between the terminals 
in the city and the Voltri terminal, outside of the city centre: 
     
“[In the city terminals ] just look for yourself, on a normal day here how many vehicles go in 
and out, we got used to it and it would be impossible to check it all as if traffic was an 
extraordinary thing; it’s ordinary, very ordinary indeed (…) There [in VTE] it’s really about 
the territory and the shape of the terminal. Voltri is organised in a way so that entry and exit 
are on the same route, confined in a relatively small area (…) it’s constantly evolving and 
better controlled. In the city terminals, instead, the situation is totally different; the port in the 
city is much older and it’s confusing, it’s in the middle of the traffic of the city, entry and exits 
are more…fluid, let’s say fluid”.
Infiltration in the legal economy
The different segments of the port economy are opportunities that the city economy offers to 
organised crime. Criminal networks and business actors meet in collusive and corruptive networks 
around the port, making the port another grey area of licit and illicit economic activities and actors of 
the city (Sciarrone, 2011; Sciarrone and Storti, 2016). Within this category, organised crime groups 
participate to dirty economies (Ruggiero, 1996). When it comes to the infiltration in the port economy 
and/or services, case law becomes more rarefied and interviews/focus groups less specific in their 
references. Often, organised crime groups’ infiltrations, or attempts to infiltrate, port economy, or 
services, are unearthed during drug trafficking investigations: criminal groups use business in the port 
(i.e. transport companies) to conceal and support trafficking, often by infiltrating the supply chain. 
For example, this is how an Antimafia Prosecutor describes a case of heroin arriving in Genoa in 
2018:
“When the narcotics arrived, the containers were handled like any other type of good. We 
knew the buyer was a company in Czech Republic, and they got in touch with the forwarding 
agent here in Genoa to agree where to send the containers. The forwarder then agreed with 
the buyer on how to actually send the products, that was by placing the containers on a truck. 
The buyer sounded very worried about how and where the containers would have been 
arranged by the transport company (…). They agree on an address in the Netherlands. We 
understood then that the Czech company was a shell, and the forwarding agent had been 
fooled”.
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Infiltrating the port economy, however, also means exploiting the opportunity of contracts for 
services at the port, i.e. construction, supply of machinery, catering services and so on. Two sets of 
illegal activities have revolved around the construction of a new terminal for rail transport on a strip 
of land between Spinelli and SECH, named Calata Bettòlo (operational at the end of 2019). All three 
companies that won the contract had been under investigation for mafia links in the construction 
industry between Calabria and Sicily. In 20168 one of the companies, Tecnis S.p.a. was interdicted 
and placed under coerced administration for mafia infiltration by one of the strongest clans of Sicilian 
cosa nostra, the Santapaola, in Catania. Second, another investigation in 20159 brought to light more 
mafia links aimed at waste trafficking. In particular, 8 people were accused of falsifying the entrance 
of goods in Calata Bettòlo. Waste, disguised as demolition material, was buried in the construction 
site in 2014-15: entrepreneurs, transport staff and managers of the site were charged with fraud and 
environmental crimes. Personnel working on site had contacts with members of both a ‘ndrangheta 
clan from Crotone, Calabria, and the above-mentioned Santapaola clan in Sicily. This was discussed 
with a prosecutor who confirmed the “complexity of the case” as “the investigations on mafia 
interests and rogue business in Calata Bettòlo are far from being over notwithstanding the 
progression of construction on site”. 
According to the DIA (2018: 233), mafia groups, especially linked to the ‘ndrangheta, in 
Genoa are well entrenched in the city’s economy and politics and this links to the port: 
“Not only they are acquiring political and administrative positions, but also privileged spots 
in different economic sectors as well as in the trafficking of narcotics (cocaine mainly), thanks 
to the proximity of important ports”. 
This was confirmed in the interview at the DIA, even though one needs to be always careful 
to ‘blame it on the mafia’ alone, as other types of organised crime and corruption are actually more 
widespread:
“There are few situations that somehow erode the sturdiness of the port, we feel it, we know 
it…corruption, clientelism, but to what extent are we able to actually understand how 
occasional or systemic they are? (…) We would like to investigate more, contracts with 
suspected links to some mafia clans in the city and other forms of corruption, but we can’t for 
many reasons, including resources and tenability at trial”.
8 Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Prima Penale Sent. Num. 52933 -14.12.2016 avverso la sentenza n. 851/2013 
Corte d’Appello di Catania, del 10/09/2014
9 See Rifiuti sospetti, sequestro a Calata Bettolo, 7 August 2014, La Repubblica Archive, 
https://genova.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/07/news/rifiuti_sospetti_sequestro_a_calata_bettolo-93308632/ 
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The port security manager at SECH, while commenting on the events of Calata Bettòlo, 
summarised an interesting perspective on the importance that space – or rather the lack of it – can 
have when it comes to investments around the port:
     
“A square metre in the port is gold. Why? Because this is the history of Genoa, of a city 
pressed between the mountains and the sea. It doesn’t have more space, it does not have a 
proper dry port behind. It’s a stretched and slim city, 40 km long and 5 km deep, in between 
two valleys (…) Turning the water into land – this is the history of Genoa - such as where we 
are now, here at SECH, it used to be water, now it’s land”. 
     
Indeed, as the port territory is very limited and cannot be stretched out any longer, its value 
tends to be also overstretched. Each opportunity of investment in the port, especially when linked to 
construction and assets, attracts funds in what is essentially a very reduced space for manoeuvre, bit 
physically and metaphorically. In this space the port economy includes and excludes investors coming 
from the city and often beyond the city. There is an ideal boundary between the port economy and 
the economy of the rest of the city, but osmotic relationships are obviously the norm (Van den Berghe 
and Daamen, 2020). Criminal networks and collusive groups who have their relationships with other 
businesses and in other sectors of the city are more likely to be able to move in such a reduced space. 
“Competition is fierce”, as noticed by an Antimafia prosecutor: only those who have established prior 
relationships and have the ability to discourage, legally or illegally, other competitors by affording to 
pay higher sums or by intimidating them, eventually win contracts; these are certainly not only mafias. 
In terms of policing, it has become clear that oversight over contracts should start from considering 
the port economy as a specific space within the space of the city. Existing criminal and corruptive 
networks in the city economy are more likely to be attracted to the port economy and also likely to 
be successful in securing access to it. 
Governance of territory
The port is also a territory within the urban context, over which different actors seek to gain 
influence for the sake of economic or political power, and, through power, increase their profit, legally 
or illegally. In the city-port scenario, governance comes to manifest in two ways: first, governance 
can mean (quasi) permanent control on illegal activities through and via the port. Second, governance 
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can be the authority exercised over political and economic processes at the port - thus the influence 
sought in port development strategies and administration.
In the first meaning, governance equates to the capability of certain groups to monitor and 
dominate information in relation to illicit port activities, for example through influence on the port 
authorities or control over the unions of port workers (Jacobs, 2006). Jacobs and Peters (2003: 232) 
have argued: “control over a union was immensely valuable to the organised crime bosses, who could 
steal from the union coffers and extort money from employers. In addition, they could barter union 
support to politicians in exchange for immunity from investigation and prosecution”. This scenario 
is excluded in Genoa, notwithstanding the involvement of some port workers, sporadically, in 
criminal trafficking. This proves to be a sensitive issue, however: as said, the CULMV (the port 
workers’ union) has a longstanding history of political influence and therefore, warn antimafia 
authorities, could become a target for criminal factions interested in ‘investing’ in this type of 
governance. Security officers in SECH and VTE also commented about the position of economic 
advantage granted to port workers of the CULMV for allocation of work in the terminal: it could 
secure electoral support from port workers when needed. 
As most of it remains hearsay, it is not easy to track the presence (or indeed exclude the 
absence) of organised crime groups interested in the governance, illicit, political or administrative, of 
the port territory on a stable basis. More attention to unduly influence of dirty economics or mafia-
type governance in this sector is certainly advocated for by most interviewees. 
Secondly, the governance of the port economy, in administrative and political terms, is highly 
competitive, highly concentrated and highly remunerative. As reported by the Antimafia 
Commission, in seaports, administrative and political governance are intertwined with the port 
economy and also linked to criminal activities (Commissione Antimafia, 2011: 28):
     
“There are activities of corruption [in the port governance] a so because whenever there are 
such enormous quantities of drugs transiting, criminal networks, including mafia groups, 
need to establish collusive links within the port infrastructures. Even if there are very few 
cases of that, their weight is significant”.
 
A complex judicial case that started in 2003 and ended in 201410 involved corruption, bribery 
and bid rigging of contracts for the development of the port and in particular the procedure to assign 
state-owned maritime land (including the management of the above-mentioned Calata Bettòlo). The 
case saw individuals working close to the directorate of the Port Authority, managers, engineers and 
10 Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Penale Sesta, Sentenza N. 32237 - 13.03.2014
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entrepreneurs in the port economy, forming a cartel that, through intimidation, could/would have 
pushed away competitors. The aim was an agreement on the allocation of contracts and 
subcontracts ex ante and before any public evaluation of tenders. The Court of Cassation described 
the context as “characterised by informal meetings, agreements and pressures, that were all but 
unusual”11. The Court noticed how the institutional setting of the port does not respond to normal 
public administration logics:
            
“The Port Authority enjoys a substantial sphere of discretional power. It is not possible to 
consider the existence of a public tender in the cases where potential contractors are 
individually invited to present their bids but the Authority remains free to choose the winner 
within a framework of convenience and opportunity similar to that of the private sector”.
 
The discretional power that drives decision processes around development and management 
in the port can lead to illegal activities, abuse of power, informal trafficking of favours and agreements 
where - as shared by one of the prosecutors in Genoa - “a sort of legalised enterprise criminality 
where private interests convert into public ones” becomes the way to govern sectors of the port.
Only a few cases of white-collar and corporate criminality have emerged from case law in 
Genoa, and interviewees often speculated on the presence of mafia money or power within these 
networks. Indeed, this is the scenario where mafia-type groups can or could be able to act, as they are 
groups aiming at a long-term strategy of territorial sovereignty (Varese, 2011), but it is a difficult 
scenario to investigate. We know that contemporary mafia groups in urban spaces use corruption as 
well as threats of violence to maintain their reputation and increase the likelihood of impunity and 
profit (Sergi, 2019; Chiodelli, 2019; Campana and Varese, 2018; Gambetta, 1993). Mafia-type groups 
are likely to influence the governance of a small space – with more predictable interactions across 
fewer influential actors (Dalla Chiesa, 2010) - by aligning with the interests of one or more actor in 
that territory, i.e. political or social sectors.  
Finally, the reduced availability of space in Genoa does affects the governance of the port as 
a territory, split among different authorities, private and public. Indeed, when discussing the difficulty 
of policing the waterfront with the Guardia di Finanza during one of the focus groups, it was noticed 
how:
“This is a territory that does not allow any further possibility…there is no space here. Of 
course, there could be decisions to build or expand [the port] but the territory is what it is, 
11 Ibid, page 47
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there is no space left. What could be built was done decades ago, relationships have been 
made over 30 years ago now, and they stayed on”.
 
The relationship between private terminals and public authorities in the port environment is 
ontologically confrontational especially in the field of port security (Brewer, 2014), due to the 
different aims pursued: terminals aim at boosting productivity, law enforcement aims at crime 
disruption and prevention. Both private owners of terminal facilities and public authorities keep 
amicable relationships in Genoa. However, as private companies are “tenants” in the port facilities, 
they often perceive public law enforcement entering their premises not only as a disruption in their 
daily job, but also as an intrusion in “their house”. Territoriality is advocated at the terminal level. 
As noticed by the PFSO in SECH:
     
“Privatisation of the land, that’s the key to understand our relationship. It’s been 25 years 
but it’s like only 2 passed. Until 1994 authorities could enter and circulate in the port as they 
pleased and this is still the way they behave; at all times and the question remains, who is in 
charge here? (…) You enter my house, you have to have a reason or an authorisation, 
otherwise you shouldn’t enter right? In theory this is my house, I pay the rent, right? But 
obviously they always have a reason to enter”.
     
It is certainly a shared and multi-party governance that works in the securitisation of the port. 
An understanding of the interests at play in the territory helps mapping vulnerabilities that organised 
crime or mafia-type groups can exploit to exercise potential or effective influence of port operators. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion
Some initial considerations on the relationship between ports and their cities emerge, through 
the tri-partite analyses of organised criminality on the waterfront, in the case study of Genoa. The 
analysis shows how serious and organised criminality in the port goes far beyond illegal trafficking; 
the port economy is a particularly attractive sector for illicit investments of all kinds, aimed at profit 
as well at power and influence. This aspect needs to be further explored in future research. 
We have noticed the importance of space and geography to understand the city-port 
relationship. While on one side influenced by the vicissitudes of global capitalism, on the other side, 
port cities are still local universes where complex and dynamic urban identities materialise and 
transform (Andrade and Costa, 2020). Urban identity is in itself a fragmented and constantly evolving 
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concept that considers different social actors, interests and architectures (Harney, 2006). The port 
represents a portion of urban identity and actively contributes to changing and defining it. As noticed 
by Ducruet (2007:168), “the closer ports are to the heartland, the less their port-city equilibrium will 
be realised, given the concentration of flows and the indirect dependence on inland markets”. If this 
is true from a geographical perspective on transport it can also be true for the criminal dimension; 
illicit flows in Genoa not only concentrate in the city but also depend on inland markets. Organised 
crime groups and activities in cities – even so in port cities - are often intertwined with the global 
trade as well as mirroring the different composition of ethnicities and the territorial fragmentation of 
the urban landscape (Hobbs, 2013). 
It is argued that an integrated approach that looks at the countering of organised crime 
activities in the port as tightly linked with an understanding (and therefore countering) of the criminal 
landscape in the city might bring interesting insights. Graphic 2 places the three trajectories of 
organised crime on two spectra: one moving from the port to the city and the other moving from 
profit-driven only criminal groups, to mafia-type groups, both profit and power driven. 
[Insert graphic 2]
What this graphic summarises is that criminal groups active across the three trajectories of 
organised crime will have different types of links with the surrounding space and the local economy, 
and will be more or less visible in the criminal landscape. 
Watching the city means watching criminal actors and how they move in the city space to 
understand what kind of interest they might have in the port. The reality of the port will mirror into 
the scenarios emerging from the city, because the space the of the city heavily affects the way the 
port is built, policed and governed. 
The port can be understood as a synecdoche of the city. The particular space of the port is, in 
fact, influenced by the general geography of the city and this has various effects of port criminality 
in all the three dimensions we have discussed in this paper. An understanding and a mapping of the 
criminal actors in the city might shed light and offer insights on potential criminal behaviours 
expected, predictable or already active in the port. This relationship relates to the evolution of criminal 
opportunity in the era of global economics and the challenges of trying to manage local 
transformations within global drives (Giddens, 1990).
Policing organised crime in the port, and therefore providing security of its territories and 
activities, means understanding flows and networks (Castell, 2000): who has the capacity, the 
resources and the intent to enter the port territory and economy for different types of illicit activities 
and from different locations. There is a greater scope, we can argue, to develop spectra of 
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criminality/transgression and security responses, and to tie these to questions on the urban 
environment, global economics, and municipal management of the port-city interface (Daamen and 
Louw, 2016). 
The port requires specialist and diversified policing approaches, from different institutions, 
from municipal to national and international. These institutions will have to liaise with authorities in 
the city in what will be a strategic and specialist cross-trajectory approach based on the following 
starting points:
1) From the case study at hand, it appears that the majority of the trafficked inbound goods 
do not remain in the vicinity of the port, but transit elsewhere. Some actors appear sporadically in the 
city and will rely on communications from different areas of the country or the world; in this case, 
importation and distribution networks that cut through the city and via the port should be at the core 
of investigations on trafficking. 
2) Infiltration in the port economy refers to attempts to influence or acquire business 
opportunities, ranging from infiltration in the supply chain to the provision of services on the grounds. 
These activities are both aimed at increasing revenues as well as laundering money, thus they are 
carried out by organised crime groups who are able to be active both in the illegal and in the legal 
worlds, capable and willing to acquire power over certain economic sectors. Actors involved in these 
activities might be already present in the city. Even when they are external investors active in the 
global maritime economy, they will interact with partners in the territory anyway through brokers, 
investors, legal figures and third parties to get a foot in the territory to carry out their activities. 
Investigations in this city-port relationship needs to depart from tracking the level of sophistication 
of certain groups and their ability to launder money through the legitimate economy in the city, 
through corruptive or collusive pacts with corporations or other business partners, or via small firms.
3) In terms of governance, the port-city relationship develops across a range of influential 
political and economic actors around the city, with the ability and the will to access the port 
administration to further their profit and increase their influence and power. A strong presence of 
mafia-type clans in the city might result in their interest in port governance. Investigations in this 
relationship need to consider the ability of mafia clans to interact and dominate economic and political 
sectors (Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016) in different industries and markets in the city. The port is a 
territory where influence, power and consensus are convergent with economic success (Jacobs and 
Peters, 2003). In a highly networked and globalised economy, such as the port economy, the loss of 
power at the national level produces to serve the needs of the markets, the possibility for new forms 
of power and politics at the local level is predictable (Sassen, 2000).
The space and geography of the city and the port also influence policing strategies. On one 
hand the port needs to appear as a ‘fortress’ (Smith, 2019), look and feel secure, impenetrable but yet 
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accessible (Whelan and Molnar, 2018). On the other hand, the city has today but one form of centrality 
(Sassen, 2000) and therefore some areas will remain unregulated because of the layers of complexity 
in coordinating and prioritising plural and multi-agency policing (Loader, 2000). 
Policing efforts will need to develop different strategies for each manifestation of organised 
crime in the port: Investigating trafficking is intelligence-led and often cross-border in nature; it 
requires deductive skills. Investigations into irregularities of port economics and dangerous liaisons 
in port governance are more local, resource-intensive and essentially evolve into anti-corruption and 
anti-collusion efforts; these are inductive. Arguably, the rules of trade and the needs to obey the neo-
liberal turn of cultures of capital (Bartilow and Eom, 2009), affect the success of illicit trafficking 
and infiltration in the legal economy more than the failures of security and policing.
The more exposed, open and receiving is the port to routes of trades, the more sporadic actors 
are likely to transit through the port and the higher the likelihood that the port will serve as a hub for 
surrounding areas as well. At the same time, however, the closer the relationship between criminal 
actors and their territory, the higher the probability for these actors to invest in their territory. And 
finally, the higher the ability to embed themselves in the territory, the higher the influence exercised 
in the port economy or governance. The rates of penetration and success of different criminal actors 
in a port are likely to be shaped by the interaction that these actors have in the urban criminal 
landscape. Nevertheless - even in the apparent simplicity of such a statement - the port-city 
relationship, for the study of organised crime, is very complex and needs to be meticulously assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.
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Tables and Graphics 
[Table 1] 
Authority Function/Aim
Capitaneria di Porto (within the Port Authority) Regulation, surveillance and control of all port 
activities.
Autorità Portuale (Port Authority) Regulation and coordination of norms and 
directives related to port activities, port facilities 
leases and maintenance. 
Polizia di Frontiera (Border Police) Running security check-points for the Ministry 
of Interiors; crime prevention and repression; 
surveillance over security services in port 
facilities; assistance to public prosecutor for 
police activities at the border. 
Guardia di Finanza (Fiscal Police) Military wing of the Ministry of Finance; public 
order and surveillance of the port (one office in 
the city and one in VTE); crime prevention and 
risk assessments for imports/exports. 
Agenzia delle Dogane (Customs Agency) Tax and Revenue authority within the Ministry 
of Finance with offices in VTE and the city; 
collections of custom duties; controls over 
incoming and outgoing goods; anti-fraud 
controls.
Terminal (Port Facility) Management of security through the nomination 
of a PFSO (Port Facility Security Officer) who is 
responsible for the Security Plan and its 
implementation. 
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[Table 2] Containers (figures for February 2019)12 – in TEU
     
Southern European Container Hub (SECH) 
Terminal 
21,481 TEU
Spinelli Terminal 32,778 TEU
Voltri Terminal Europe (VTE) Terminal 126,430 TEU
Port of Genoa total February 2019 202,145 (tons 1,938,391)
[Table 3] Containers and geographical areas during 201813  - imports (in) and exports (out) of 
selected countries. 
Area Import Export
Spain 71,443 TEU Spain 68,440 TEU Europe
Greece 23,868 TEU Greece 19,448 TEU
USA 94,660 TEU USA 183,833 TEUNorth America
Canada 27,855 TEU Canada 57,817 TEU
Mexico 11,962 TEU Mexico 21,862 TEU 
Cuba 9,083 TEU Cuba 6,047 TEU
Central America 
     Dominican Rep. 6.678 TEU Dominican Rep. 3.362 TEU
Brazil 57,719 TEU Brazil 68,088 TEUSouth America
     Colombia 11,152 TEU Colombia 6,047 TEU 
Morocco 39,601 TEU Morocco 18,872 TEU Africa 
Egypt 27,789 TEU Egypt 37,768 TEU
Total Port of Genoa 1,283,302 TEU 1,325,836 TEU
Graphic 1
12 Traffici Porto di Genova Merci - http://servizi.porto.genova.it/archivio/TRAF/TERM/14519.ashx 
13Traffico contenitori in TEU suddivisi per nazioni e aree geografiche
 http://servizi.porto.genova.it/archivio/TRAF/PORTO/14444.ashx 
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Graphic 2
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